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PRESIDENT NIXON'S JOURNEY TO 
PEKING 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on 
the eve of the President's journey to 
Peking I think it is 8JPro'pos to make a 
few remarks. May I say that the ma.tter 
of the President's visit to the People's 
Republic of China has been a matter of 
discussion between the President a.nd the 
Senator from Montana for 3 years this 
month. 
During that time he has ment:daned his 
desire to revive the Wa.rsa.w talks so that 
contacts could continue to be ma'intained 
between the Chinese and U.S. Ambas-
sadors in the Capital of Poland, which 
started, incidentally, in the summer of 
1954 at the conclusion of the first 
Geneva conference. 
Second, he indicated that it was his 
desire at an appropriate time to remove 
the secondary and primary boycott 
against the People's Republic of China, 
which has been in e!Iect since 1951 and 
which always was counterproductive. 
Third, he indicated it was his intention 
to broaden the list of Americans who may 
visit China, subject, of course, to ap-
proval by China. 
Fourth, he stated that at an appropri-
ate time it was his intention to consider 
the possihUity of allowing the Chinese, 
on the same basis a.s the Soviet Union, to 
be eligible for nonstrategic items. 
Filth, he indicated that he would do 
his best to increase trade possibilities be-
tween our two countries. 
Sixth, he expressed the hope that he 
would be able to fulfill a long-held desire 
to visit China, which he is now about 
to do. 
Incidentally, he will be the first Amer-
ican Chief of State to visit the People's 
Republic of China and also when he visits 
Moscow in May, he will be the first Amer-
ican Chief of State to visit the S0\1 t 
Union. 
Mr. President, about 4 years ago, the 
University of Montana initiated a new 
public lecture series. The University wa.s 
kind enough to invite me to deliver the 
first address. In contrast to today, the 
subject which wa.s selected was not much 
in the public awareness in those days. 
The remarks were entitled "China Ret-
rospect, and Prospect." 
I have just reread the statement which 
I delivered at the University on March 
29, 1968. It was, in general, a plea to the 
largely student-audience to cut away the 
shackles of thought which an older gen-
eration, of which I am a part, had self-
imposed on itself in its reactions to the 
cataclysmic experience of the Chinese 
revolution. I urged the students to exam-
ine new approaches, approaches which 
might provide the beginnings of a. begin-
ning in restoring relations of peace with 
China.. 
For the most, the approaches which 
were discussed then have now been in-
corporated into the fore1gn policies of the 
Nation. President Nixon has played an 
exceptional personal role in bnnging 
about this transition. He has ended the 
boycott on Chinese goods. He has not 
only removed the ban on travel to China 
but has given encouragement to visits, 
through his words and. of course, his per-
sonal example. 
Most pertinent, the President ha.s 
acted to change the language of inter-
course between the two nations from 
that of mutual hostility and deprecation 
to tolerance. In so doing, the President 
has set the stage, in my judgment, for 
a peaceful evolution of United States-
Chinese relations which could serve well 
that generation of students whom I ad-
dressed 4 years ago and their successor& 
for many years to come. 
There is no assurance, of course, that 
this evolution will occur but the door is 
opened by the President's impending visit. 
Clearly, it. will take far more than a visit 
of state to undo the knots of two decades 
of a venomous acrimony. Nevertheless, I 
know the Senate joins with me in wish-
ing President Nixon every success in the 
endeavor which he is about to undertake. 
Mr. Preshient, just for my own per-
sonal benefit I wish to read the conclud-
ing portion of that speech which I gave 
at the University of Montana 4 years ago: 
To sum up, then, 1t seems to me that the 
baste adjustment which Is needed In policies 
respecting China Is to make crystal clear 
that this government does not antlclpa.te, 
much less does It seek, the overthrow of the 
government of the Chinese mainland. In ad-
dition, there Is a need to end the discrimina-
tion which consigns China to an Interior 
sta t us as among the Communist countries 
In this nation's pollcles respecting travel and 
trade. Finally, It ought to be made unequiv-
ocal that we are prepared at aJl times to 
meet with Chinese representatiVJlS-formally 
or Informally-In order to consider differ-
ences between China and the United States 
over VIet Nam or any other question of 
common concern. 
Adjustments of this kind In the pollc!es of' 
the nation, It seems to me, require above all 
eLse a fresh perspective . We need to see the 
situation In Asia as It Is today, not as It ap-
jj<)ared tw nty yea.re ,ago ln the Himalayan 
upheaval of the Chln~e revolution. We need 
to seo the sl tuatlon not through the fog of 
an old and stagnant hostility but In the light 
of the enduring tutertsts of the United States 
1.1 the Western Pacific. 
In th'.s context we will better be able to 
find appropriate responses at appropriate 
tl ucs to the specific problems of the Stoo-
l relatlo lp, whether they have to do 
with U.N representation or diplomatic 
recognl tlon or the o!Tshore lsla.nds or what-
ever. Without prior adjustmPnt In perspec-
tive, however to eek tp deal definitively 
with the: e questions. would be, to say the 
,east, an exercise In !utll!ty. 
I hould emphasize before concluding that 
It 1s un11lcely that there wlll be any eager 
Chinese responses to Initiatives on our part. 
Nevertheless. I see nothing to be lost for this 
nation In trying to move along the l!nes 
which have been suggested. Chinese Intran-
sigence Is no l!cense for American Intran-
sigence. Our stake In the situation In the 
Western Pac!tl.c Is too large !or that sort of 
Infantile Indulgence. 
I see great relevance In thinldng deeply 
of the Issues which divide China and the 
United States to see 11 they can be recast 
In new and uncluttered molds. There Is every 
reason, especially for young people, to 
examine most closely the premises of policy 
regarding China which were enshrined aJ-
moat two decades ago. The fact Is that the 
breakdown In Chlnese-U S. relations was one 
or the great !allures of my generation and 
It Is highly doubtful that Its full repair shall 
be seen In my ll!etlme. The problem. there-
fore will !a.lllargely to you. 
Tllis wa.s delivered to the student body 
at the University of Montana at Missoula, 
but it applied to all young people all 
over the country. 
It Is not a particularly happy Inheritance, · 
but there Is reason to hope that It may fare 
better In your hands. 
Unlike my generation. you know more 
about Asia. You have a greater awareness 
ot Its Importance to this nation and to the 
wor~d . In 1942. !our months after Pearl 
Harbor, !or example. an opinion poll found 
that sixty percent of a natlonaJ sample of 
Americans still could not locate either China. 
or India on an outl!ne map o! the world. 
Certainly that would not be the case today. 
Furthermore, you have not had the experi-
ence of national trauma In moving abruptly 
from an era marked by an almost !awning 
benevolence toward China to one of thorough 
disenchantment. You were spared the fierce 
hostll!tles which rent this nation Internally. 
as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and security 
regarding China gave way to feelings of 
revulsion. hatred, and ln.secur!ty. 
Your Ch!I'.ese counterparts, the young 
people of today·s China-they are called the 
'"Heirs of the Revolut!on··-have a s!mllar 
gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific. 
Your generation tn China, too, has been con-
tained and ISolated. and Its view o! the United 
States has been colored with the hates of 
another time. It has had no contact with 
you or, Indeed, with much of the world out-
side ChJna. 
On the other hand, those young people 
have grown up under easter conditions than 
the older generation of Chinese who lived 
their youth In years or continuous war and 
revolution. It may be that they can !ace you 
e.nd the rest o! the world with greater 
equanamtty and a.ssurance than has been the 
ca~e at any time In mt·dern Chinese history. 
I urge you to think for yourselves about 
China I urge you to tpproach, with a new 
objectivity, that vast 1a.t!on, with Its great 
)>OPulat!on of lndust ·tous and Intelligent 
people. Bear In mind that the peace of Asia 
and the world will dep,·nd on China as much 
as It does on this nation, the Soviet Union 
or any other, not because China Is Commu~ 
n!st but because China Is Ch1na.--tUnong the 
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largest countries In the world and the most 
populous. 
Mao Tse-Tung remarked In an Interview 
several years ago that "future events would 
be decided by future generations." Insofar as 
his words Involve the relationship of this 
nation and China, whether they prove to be 
a prophecy of doom or a forecast of a happier 
future will depend not so much on us, the 
"Old China Hands" of yesterday, but on yolL 
the "New American Hands" of tomorrow. 
So, Mr. President, again I wish to ex-
tend to the President every wish for his 
success on this momentous journey. 
I ask unanimous consent that the full 
text of my remarks, verbatim, as deliv-
ered at the University of Montana on 
March 29, 1968, be included at this point 
in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
LECTURE BY SENATOR Ml.KE MANSFIELD (D., 
MONTANA) 
(Sponsored by the Maureen and Mil<e Mans-
field Endowment (The University of Mon-
tana Foundation) at the University of 
Montana, Missoula, Montana, Friday, 
March 29, 1968) 
CHINA: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
VIetNam Is heavy on the heart of the na-
tion. The VIetnamese war Is a tragedy. It IS 
a tragedy In the American lives which It 
claims. It Is a tragedy In the death and devas-
tation which, In the name of salvation, It 
has spread throughout VIet Nam 
My views on United States policy respect-
Ing VIet Nam are no secret. I have stated 
them, restated them, and elaborated them 
many times. I have cautioned against an 
ever-deepening mllltary Involvement In that 
conflict. I am opposed to any Increase In It 
today. I believe that the way out of a bar-
barous situation 1s not to go further Into lt. 
The first step towards peace, In my judg-
ment, Is to concentrate and consolidate the 
U.S. mUitary effort and to escalate the peace-
effort, looking towards the negotiation of an 
honorable end of the contlict. 
That, In brief, 1s the way I !eel about VIet 
Nam. That Is the way I have felt about It for 
a long time. The President knows lt. The Sen-
ate knows lt. Montana knows lt. 
What I have to say to you, today, touches 
only Indirectly on VIet Nam. My remarks are 
Intended to go beyond VIet Nam to what may 
well be the roots of the war. In this first lec-
ture of the series on International affairs, I 
wish to address your attention to what 1s the 
great void In the foreign relations of this na-
tion-to the question of China.. 
As a. nation, we have lived through a. gen-
eration In only heresay association with a 
third of the entire human race . At the in-
ception of this void, we were enga.ged In a. 
costly and Indecisive conflict In Korea-{)n 
China's northeast frontier. Two decades later, 
we are engaged once again In a costly and 
Indecisive contlict, this time on China's 
southeast frontier. These two great mlllta.ry 
Involvements on the Chinese periphery are 
not unrelated to the absence of relevant 
contact between China and the United 
States. 
Sooner or later a tenuous truce may be 
achieved In VIet Nam even as a truce was 
achieved In Korea. In my judgment, how-
ever, there Will be no durable peace In Korea, 
VIet Nam, or anywhere else in Asia unless 
<there 1s a. candid confrontation With the 
problems o! the Sino-U.S. relationship. 
China needs peace 1f the potentials of Its 
culture are to be realized. This ua.tton needs 
peace for the same reason. In this day and 
age, the world needs peace !or ctVUil'ft'd sur-
vival. You young people have the greatest 
stake In peace. For that reason, I ask you to 
look beyond VIetNam, behind Korea., to what 
may well be the core of the fall ure o! peace 
In Asla.--to the U.S.-Chlnese estrangement of 
two decades. 
In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, sent the first 
American clipper ship to trade with China. 
The year that President George Washington 
took the oath of office, 1789, fourteen Ameri-
can ships were riding a.t anchor In the Pearl 
River off Canton in South China. 
There are no American ships In Chinese 
ports today. There have not been !or almost 
twenty years. In twenty years, hardly an 
American doctor, scientist, businessman, 
journalist, student, or even a tourist has set 
foot In China. 
Across the Pacific Ocean, we a.nd the 
Chinese glare at one another, uncompre-
hendingly, apprehensively, and stlsplclously. 
In the United States, there Is fear u! the 
suddent march of Chinese armies Into South· 
east Asia.. In China., there Is fear ot a tighter 
American encirclement and American nu-
clear attack. 
We see mUllens o! Chinese soldiers poised 
on China's frontiers . We see leaders who 
threaten In a most violent way. We see &n 
Internal Chinese turmoll to confirm our fears 
of lrratlona.Ilty and recklessness. Finally \\ e 
see a groWing nuclear power, with the loom 
lng spectre of a full-fledged Chinese Inter-
continental ballistic missile force. 
On the other hand, the Chinese see them-
selves surrounded by massive American mlll· 
ta.ry power. They see U.S. naval, ground, aPd 
air bases scattered through Japan, Korea 
Ta.lwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Phlllpplnes, 
and Thailand. They see over hal! a million 
American troops In neighboring VIet Nam 
and hundreds o! thousands more nearby 
They see tremendous nuclear capabl!lty with 
mtssUes zeroep In on Chmese cities. They 
see the United States as "occupying" the 
Chinese Island of Taiwan and supporting a 
Chinese government whose declared aim I 
the recapture of the mainland. And they 
see, too, what they describe as a growing col-
lusion between the United State' and the 
Soviet Union, a country which they be!leve 
1ntrlnges China's borders, threatens to uor-
rupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an 
unwelcome Influence throughout Asia 
We and the Chinese have not always looked 
at one another with such baleful m1 tru t 
The American Images of China have ftuctu-
a.ted and shifted In an almost cyclical way 
There has been the Image o! the China of 
wisdom, Intelligence, Industry, piety, sto c-
tsm, and strength. This Is the China of Marco 
Polo. Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan, a.nd heroic 
resistance to the Japanese during World 
War II. 
On the other hand, there has been the 
lm.&.ge ot the China of cruelty, barbarism, 
violence, and faceless hordes. This Is the 
China of drum-head trials, summary execu-
tions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion 
the China that Is summed up In the phrase 
"yellow perU." 
Throughout our history, these two Images 
have alternated, with first one predominant 
and then the other. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, we looked up to China. as an ancient 
clvil12la.tlon-<~uperlor In many aspects of 
technology, culture, and social order and 
surrounded by an air o! splendid mystery. 
Respect turned to contempt, however, with 
Ch.l.n.a's quick defeat by the British In the 
Opium War of 1840. There followed acts o! 
humilla.tlon o! China such as partlclpa.t.lon 
In extra-territorial treaty rights and the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. 
Attitudes shifted a.galn In the eazly twen 
tleth century to one of benevolence largely 
In consequence o! the lniluence o! mlsslo'1-
arles. There were more missionaries In China 
!rom the United States than !rom a.ny other 
country. More American mlsslonarlll6 served 
In China than anyWhere else In the world 
The Chinese became, for this nation, a 
guld.ed, guarded, and adored people, 
Chine I< st...r. e to the Ja.panec>e Inva-
Sion In 1937 produced another shift from 
benevolenr.e to admiration. At the end of the 
Second Ward Wa.r, adm.lratlon was displaced 
by disappointment and frustration, as the 
wa,·ttme tr ICe t tween Nat! nallst and Com-
munist forces col! psed In cataclysmic In-
ternal strife This nat<or. beca.me profoundly 
dl enchanted with China a di•Pnchantment 
which was replaced a.orupL!y In Hl49 by hos-
tility. 
'The hostility was largely a reaction, of 
c .1rse to the comlug to power of a. Com-
munist reg.me on the, Chln~e mainland. We 
did not Interpret this event a.s a consequence 
of the ll'a stve dll!lcwtles and the vast Inner 
weaknesses o! a war-tom China. Rather, we 
saw I almost as an affront to this nation. 
We saw It as a treacherous extension or the 
Soviet steam-roller policies which had re-
duced Eastern a.nd Central Europe to sub-
servience at the end of World War II. 
Then, In 1948, came a Communist coup 
In Czechoslovakia. and the Soviet attempt to 
blockade Berlin The triumph of a Com-
munist government In China followed trn-
medla.t y after these events In Europe. The 
nation was shaken to Its fingertips. 
Still, the press o! events continued re-
lentlessly. In June 1950, the North Koreans 
launched a st dden atUU:k on South Korea. 
The Chinese forces Intervened In the war In 
November or that year. The United States 
was brought Into a major mUitary confron-
tation In wh ch !or the first time, the Chi-
nese were enern!e:; and not allies. 
After tt e e events, the assumptions of 
American policy towards China. were revised. 
An effort was 1nade to meet both the con-
cern ard outrage respecting China which 
existed In th nation and the revolutionary 
m1 I ancy of the new Chinese regime in Asia. 
Polley wa.s cast anew on the premise that 
the govemmert c.:> the Chinese mainland 
was a., aggressor which, subject to direc-
t ns !rom Moscow, would use force to Impose 
ter atl r l Conununlsm on Asia. Converse-
•Y •t was as umed that 1! the endorsement of 
the free nations were withheld, this regime 
whiCh was sale! to be "allen" to the Chinese 
people- orne sort of overgrown puppet of 
M ow ould wither and eventually col-
lapse 
On tt 1s ba.sls, recognition was not extended 
to Pek ng. The official view was that the 
Natlona, G"lvernment, which had retreated 
to the Island o! Taiwan, continued to speak 
for al '>! China We cut of! all trade with the 
mainland and did wlla.t could be done to 
encourge other countries to follow suit. In 
a. slmUar fashion, we led a diplomatic oom-
palgn year aftl'r year against the seating 
o! the Chlnel>e People's Republic In the 
Un'ted Nations We drew an arc or mlllta.ry 
alliances on the seaward side or China and 
Ul derglrded tl em with the deployment of 
ma.ss.ve Am rl an mUltary power In bases 
throughout th< Western Pacific. 
Much has happened to call Into question 
the assun.p oru; In which these policies to-
ward China have been rooted. In the first 
place, the People'» Republic has shown Itself 
tc be neither a part of a Communist mono-
lith nor a. t>nrbon copy o! Soviet Russia.. The 
!act l.s that of the numerous dlvl.slons which 
nave artsen within the Communist world, the 
dltferences l>etween Moscow and Peking have 
been the most significant. They so remain 
today a! though the more rasping edges o! the 
t'Ontllct appear somewhat tempered by the 
war In Viet Nam 
At the same time, the government on the 
ma.ln!and ha.s not only survlvP.d, It has pro-
vided China with a functioning leadership 
Under Its direction, Chinese society has 
achieved a degree of economic and scientific 
progress, apparently sufficient for survival o! 
an enormous and growing population and 
sophisticated enough to produce thermo-nu-
clear explo.slons. 
In the last two years, the so-called Cui-
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which Is friendly, If not subservient. Peking 
has not concealed, moreover. its desire for 
the withdrawal of American military power 
from Southeast Asia. It does not follow, how-
ever. that the price of peace In Southeast 
Asia Is either Chinese domlnatwn or U.S. 
military Intervention. That Is a black and 
white oversimplification of a gray situation. 
The fact Is that neither Burma on China's 
border nor cambodia. have been ··enslaved" 
by China, despite an association of many 
years, despite periodic difficulties with the 
great state to the north and despite an ab-
sence of U.S. support, aid, or protection. 
These two nations have managed to sur-
vive In a state of detachment from the power 
rivalries of the region. Furthermore, China Is 
a signatory to the settlements which emerged 
from the Geneva Conferences or 1954 and 
1962 and which conta.ln at least a hope for 
a middle way to peace in Indo-China.. So far 
as I am aware, the Chinese have not been 
found in direct or unilateral violation of 
these agreements. It Is not Impossible that 
a similar settlement, with Chinese participa-
tion, might be reached on VIetNam 
Indeed, It Is to be devoutly hoped that 
there can be a solution along these lines. 
Unless It Is found. there is a very rea.! dan-
ger-as the Korean experience shows--that 
the prolongation of war on China's frontiers 
may well bring about another U.S.-Chlnese 
armed confrontation. 
Perhaps the most important element In 
the rebuilding of staible relations with China 
Is to be found In a solution of the problem 
of Taiwan. It may help to come to grips with 
this Issue, If It Is understood at the outset 
that the Island of Taiwan Is Chinese. That Is 
the position of the National Government of 
the Republic of China. That Is the position 
of the People's Republic of China. For a 
quarter of a century, this common Chinese 
posl tlon has been reinforced by the policies 
and actions of the United States government 
Since that Is the case, I do not believe 
that a solution to the Taiwan question Is 
facllltated by Its statement In terms of a 
two-China policy, as has been suggested In 
some quarters In recent years. The fact Is 
that there Is one China which happens to 
have been divided into two parts by events 
which occurred a long time ago. Key !actors 
In the maintenance of peace between the 
separate segments have been the Interposi-
tion o! U.S. military power in the Taiwan 
straits, and the strengthening o! the Na-
tional Government of China by massive In-
jections o! economic and military ald. 
This course was followed by the United 
States for many reasons, not the least of 
which was that It made possible a refuge for 
dedicated allies and assoCiates In the war 
against Japan. Most of all, however, It was 
followed because to have permitted the clos-
Ing o! the breech by a military clash of the 
two opposing Chinese forces would have 
meant a massive bloodbath and, In the end, 
the reklndllng of another great war In Asia. 
However, the situation has changed In the 
Western Paclf!.c. Taiwan is no longer abjectly 
dependent !or Its survival on the United 
States. Some of the passions o! the deep 
Chinese political division have cooled with 
the passing o! time. Another generation has 
appeared and new Chinese societies, In effect, 
have grown up on both sides of the Taiwan 
Straits. 
Is there not, then, some better way to con-
front this problem than threat-and-counter-
threat between Island Chinese and mainland 
Chinese? Is there not more better way to live 
with this situation than by the armed truce 
whl.ch depends, In the last analysis, on the 
continued presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet In 
the Taiwan Straits? 
The questions cannot be answered until a.ll 
Involved are prepared to take a fresh look at 
the situation. It seems to me that It might be 
helpful I! there could be, among the Chinese 
themselves, an examination of the posslblll-
ties of Improving the climate. As l have IU• 
ready Indicated, the proper framework rc ~ 
any such consideration would be an accept-
ance of the contentiOn of both Chinese 
groups-that there Is only one China. and 
Taiwan Is a part of It, In that context, the 
questions at Issue have to do with the dichot-
omous situation as between mainland and 
Island governments and the posslhll1ty or 
bringing about constructive changes therein 
by peaceful means. 
There Is no cause t.o he sanguine about the 
prospects of an approach of this kind. One 
can only hope that time may have helped to 
ripen the circumstances !or settlemeut. It Is 
apparent, for example, that the concept 
which held the Chinese government on 
Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's re-
demption has grown less relevant with the 
years. For Taiwan, therefore, to remain Iso-
lated from the mainland Is to court the risk 
that the Island will be left once again, 8.b It 
has been on other occasions, In the backwll.Sh 
of Chinese history. 
The removal of the wedge of separation, 
moreover, would also seem to accord with the 
Interests of the mainland Chinese govern-
ment. It does have a. legitimate concern In 
the reassertion or the historic connection of 
Ta.1wan and China It does have a concern In 
ending the hostlle division which has been 
costly and disruptive both within Chin~> and 
In China's International relationships. 
From the point of view or the Unite<! 
States, too, there Is an interest In seeking a. 
less tenuous situation. Progress In settling 
the Taiwan question could contribute to a. 
general relaxation of teru.lons in the Western 
Pac1f!.c and, conceivably, even to resoiutlon o! 
the conflict In VIet Nam. Certainly, It would 
make possible a. reduction in the enormous 
and costly overall defense burdens which 
were assumed In Asian waters after World 
War II and which, two decades later, stlll rest 
on the shoulders of this nation 
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the 
basic adjustment which Is needed In policies 
respecting China Is to make cryste.l cleil.l" that 
this governm.ent does not a.ntlolpa.te. much 
less does it seek, the overthrow of the govern-
ment or the Chl.n.ese ro.a.!n.land. In addition, 
there Is a need to end the dlscrlmlnatlon 
which canstgns China to an lnfet1!or sta.tus as 
among the Communist countries in this na-
tion's policies respecting travel and tmde. 
Fln.a.lly, it ought to be ma.de unequ!V'OC&l 
that we a.re prepared at all times to meet With 
Chinese representatives-formally or lnfor-
m.a.lly-tn order to consider dlffereru:es be-
tween China and the United States over Viet 
Nam or any other question Of common con-
cern. 
Adjustments Of this ktnd 1n the pollcd.es of 
the nation, It seem.s to m.e, require above all 
else a fresh perspective. We need to see th~ 
sltua.tlon In Asia. as it Is today, not a.s It ap-
peared twenty years a.go in the Hima.la.ya.n 
upheaval of the Chinese revolution. We nee<.! 
to see the sltua.tion not through the fog or 
an old and stagnant hostility but in the light 
Of the enduring Interests of the United States 
In the Western Pacific. 
In this context we will better be able to 
f!..nd a.ppropt1late responses at app:roprla.te 
times to the speolfic problems Of the Sino-
u.s. relationship, whether they h&ve to do 
with U.N. representation or dlploma.tlc recog-
nition or the offshore Islands or whatever 
Without pr!Dr a.djustm.ent In perspective, 
however, to seek to deal definitively with 
these questions would be, to say the least, 
an exerc:lse In futility. 
I should emphasize before concluding that 
It Is unlikely th&t there Will be any eager 
Chinese resporu;es to inJtlatlves on our part. 
Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost far this 
nation In trying to move along the lines 
which have been suggested. Chinese intra.n-
~ence is no license for Amerlca.n lntra.n-
stgenoe. Our stake 1n the situation in the 
Western Pa.cif!..c Is too large !or that sort of 
inla.ntlle l.ndulgen.oe. 
I see great relevance In thinking deep! V of 
the Issues which divide China and the United 
s•.a.tes to see I! they can be recn.!>L in new and 
uncluttered molds. Tiler~ Is every reason. 
especially !or young people, to examine most 
closely the premises or policy regarding China 
which were enshrined almo~t two decadeo 
ago. The fact is that tnc breakdown In 
Chinese-U.S. relations was one of the great 
fa.1lures of my generation and It Ls highly 
doubtful that Its full repair shall be seen 1!1 
my llfetlme. The problem. thE'refol't'. wlll fall 
largely to you. It Is not a. particularly happy 
Inheritance, but there Is rcasoP to hope that 
1t may fare better In y'our hands. 
Unlike my generation, you know more 
a.oout As1a. You have a greater awareness of 
Its Importance to this nation and to the 
world. In 1942, four months CLfter Pearl Har-
bor, for example, an oplnloi! poll found that 
s1xty percent of a national sample of Ameri-
cans still could not locate either China. or 
India. on an outline map of the world. Cer-
tainly that would not be the case today 
Furthermore, you have not had the expe-
rience of national trauma. In movhig abruptly 
from an era marked by an almost fawning 
benevolence toward China to one of thorough 
disenchantment. You were spared the fierce 
hostilities which rent this nation Internally, 
as a. sense of warmth, sympathy, and security 
regarding China. gave way to feelings of re-
vulsion, hatred, and Insecurity. 
Your Chinese counterparts, the young peo-
ple of today's China-they are called the 
Heirs of the Revolutlon"-ha.ve a similar 
gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific. 
Your generation in China., too, has been con-
t.alncd and Isolated, and its view of the 
United States has been colored with the hates 
o! another tlme . It has had no contact with 
you or, Indeed, with much of the world out-
side China. 
On the other hand, those young people 
hM·e grown up under easier conditions than 
the older generation or Chinese who lived 
their youth In years of continuous war and 
revolution. It may be that they can face you 
and the rest of the world with greater equa-
nimity and assurance than has b~en the case 
at any time In modern Chinese history 
I urge you to think for yourselves about 
cr,lna I urge you to approach, with a new 
objectivity, that vast nation, with its great 
population of Industrious and Intelligent 
people. Bear In mind that the peace of Asia 
and the world will depend on China. as much 
a's It does on this nation, the Soviet Union, 
or any other, not beca.U6e China. Is Commu-
nist but because China. is China-among the 
largest coutrles In the world and the most 
populous. 
Mao Tse-Tung remarked In an Interview 
several years ago that "future events v:ould 
be decided by future generations." Insofar as 
his words Involve the relationship of this 
nation and China., whether they prove to be 
a prophecy or doom or a. forecast of a happier 
future will depend not so much on us, the 
"Old China Hands" of yesterday, but on you, 
the "New American Hands" of tomorrow. 
Mr. SCOTI. Mr. President, the dis-
tinguished majority leader, in a speech 
of some years ago, spoke with great fore-
sight and intuitive wisdom. I congratu-
late him for that, and I am delighted 
that he SJX>ke of the President's visit in 
such hopeful terms. 
We will all-the world will-watch 
this meeting. not expecting great things 
immediately, but recognizing that the 
opening of a dialog with 800 million 
people is itself a world-shaking event. 
We may achieve--and I hope we will 
achieve--..~ome easing, some solution, of 
what the Germans call Kultw-kampf der 
Menschheit, which means the cultw-aJ 
struggle of mankind. 
We have had this cultural struggle. I 
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tural Devolution in China has rekindled 
what has been a periodic expectation that the 
Pelting government is on the verge o! col-
lapse and the way 1s open !or a m1lltary re-
turn to the mainland o! the National Gov-
ernment on Taiwan. There seems to be little 
doubt that the turmoil in China has caused 
serloue disru ptions. What appears In confl.lct 
In the cultural revolution, however, is not 
the Pelting structure as such but the ade-
quacy a! Its Ideological content. That would 
be a far cry from the kind o! popular revul-
sion which might be expected to open the 
doors to a new regime. 
In any event, the worst o! the upheavals 
within China appear to have ended months 
ago, without any Irreparable break In the 
continuity o! the government or the opera-
tions of the economy. It is the height or !oily 
to envlBion, in the present situation, an oc-
casion for the overthrow at the Peklng gov-
ernment by external military pre6Sures. In-
deed, what would be bet ter calcullllted to end, 
overnight, the remaining ferment on the 
mainland than a p lausible threat to the secu-
rity o! China or an actual attack on Chinese 
terrlltory? 
I! the People's Republic, then, Is here to 
stay, what of the ot her assumption on which 
this nation's policy respecting China has long 
been based? What o! the assumption that the 
Chinese government 1s an expanding and 
aggreaslve force? That It Is restrained tram 
sweeping through Asia because we have 
elected to meet Its challenge along the 17th 
Parallel which divides the Nol'thern and 
Southern parts a! Viet Nam? 
In recent years, the present Chinese gov-
ernment has not shown any great eagerness 
to use force to spread Its ld'!Ology elsewhere 
in Asia although Chinese armies have been 
employed In assertion o! the traditional 
borders o! China. To be s ure, China has given 
enthusiastic encouragement and has prom-
Ised to support wars o! national liberation. 
However, China has not participated directly 
In these wars and support, when It has been 
forthcoming, has been limited and circum-
spect. . 
In VIet Nam, !or example, there Is certainly 
Chlnese encouragement and aid !or the 
North VIetnamese nnd the Vtet Cong. Chinese 
In volvement, however, has been tar more 
peripheral than our own. The enemy soldiers 
with whom we are compelled to grapple are 
all VIetnamese and, in fact, mostly South 
VIetnamese. At e very stage of the war, the 
assist ance we have provided to South VIet 
Nam has far exceeded the aid from Chlna and 
from all outalde sources to the VIet Cong 
and Nol'th VIet Nam-both In terms of men 
and materiel. There Is Chinese equipment In 
South VIet Nam but there are no Chinese 
battalions. Even In North VIet Nam, Chinese 
manpower Is reported to amount, at most, to 
one-tenth o! our forces In VIet Nam, and the 
great bulk a! these Chinese are labor troops, 
some Involved In air-defense but moat or 
them engaged In repairing bomb damage to 
roads, railroads, bridges, and the like. 
Ohlneee actions 1n 'I1bet, and along the 
Himalayan fron.tler of India, 6l'8 often clite<1 
as evidence at lnllltant Ohineee Communist 
~ 'I'be 1'ect 18, however, that Tibet 
has been~. !or many decades, as fall-
Ing wlt1hl.n China's over-aU boundaries. Not 
only 'bhe Pek1ng government but also the 
Ohln.eee NationAl Government on Taiwan 
1ns1sta that 'nbet belongs to Ohlna. India 
al&O acltnowledges suoh to be the case. In-
deed, Amerlea.n policy has never recognlze<1 
Tibet aa other t'ba.n Chinese territory. 
In the dllse of the border war with India 
in 1962, the Chinese Oommunlste oooupled 
temtorlee W!oh, ~n. not only they, but 
also tt.b.e ~ Nationalists, consldec" to be 
Ch:lneee. It Is nat prec!Be1.y oharacter1Btlc of 
a m111ta.nt e~. moreover, !01' a gov-
ernment to w1thdra.w 1ts military !oroee !rom 
a territory which they have Invested. YM;, 
tlbe Pek1De JO"I'DIIIUHlt did ao trom perts of 
India which were occupied In 1962 aa well as 
from North Korea. 
As !or lndlrOOt ~ion through eco-
nomic means. Ohlna has been able to exert 
only a limited J.nfiuence, elth.er through aid 
or rt;rade. In Mlica and, indeed, in southeast 
Asia, where atternpte have been made to use 
tm.de a.rul aid for polltlcal ends, the results 
hlave not been consplcwously s1WC068!ul. The 
!act 1s that moot of Ohlna's trade today roots 
on a oommercial-ooonomlc base. It Is carrled 
on large'ly w1~h t he non-COmmunist coun-
tries, Including, may I add, many of our 
closest allies. 
In abort, ·to speak of China, today, as ag-
gressively expla.nBd.ontst is to reepond to Chl-
nese words rather tha.n Chln.e6e actions. Th.at 
1s not to say that China will not pose all 
manner of thres.te tom.orrow. It there are not 
en.ough nl3htmaree elrea.dy, oonslder the 
proopecta when Oh.tn.a's n u.olear ca.pa.bllltles 
will have been extensively developed, along 
with a !ul1-fied@ed lnterrontlnental bell1stlc 
missile force. 
Of course, there Is an Immense potential 
danger 1n Ohlna.; •but rthere Is also an IJ:nmenae 
potential danger In every oth er powerful 
nation In a world which has not yet ~earned 
haw to maintain clvlllzed su rvival 1n a nu-
clear e.ge except on the razor's edge. Insofar 
as Ohina Is concerned, the 11\lnd&mental 
question !or us Is not whether 1t Is a danger, 
real or .potentl81!.. The ! undwmental question 
1s Vo'hether our preeen t rpollcles act to allevi-
ate or to exacerbate the danger. Do we tore-
stall the cta.nger by jousting with the shadows 
and sueplclons of the p ast? Do we help by a 
continuance 1n pollcles which do little If any-
thing to lift the h eavy curtaln o! mutual 
Ignorance and hos t1llty? 
Like It or not, the present Ohlne&e gov-
ernment Is here to stay. Like It or not, Chlna 
Is a major power 1n Asia and Is on the way 
to becoJlllng a nuclear power." Is It, therefore, 
In this nation's Interest and 1n the Interest 
o! world peace to 'Pilt aside, once <~.nd tor all, 
what have been the persistent but futile 
attempts to 18olate Ohlna? Is It, therefore, In 
this nation's Interest and in •the tntere~t of 
world peace to try conscientiously and con-
sistently .to do whatever we can do--and, 
admittedly, It Is not much-to res~ the 
relatloDBhlp wtth t he Chinese along more 
construct! ve and stable lines? In abort, Is It 
propitious for this na.tlon to try to do ~t. 
1n fact, the policies of m ost of the other 
Western democracies have already long elnce 
done regarding their Chlnese re'latlonshlps? 
I must say that the deepening of the con-
filet Jn VIet Na.m makes m ore dlnlcult ad-
justments 1n policies respecting China. In-
deed, the !Present course o! events 1n VIet 
iNam almost Insures that there shall be no 
oha~s. It Is not easy to contemplate an 
elllevla.tlon with any nation which oheers on 
those who are eilg'Gged in lnftlotlng caaual ties 
on Americans. Yet, It may well be that this 
alleviation 1s an essential aspect of endlng 
t he war a.nd, hence, .Anler lcan oasual ties. 
Tha.t consideration, alone, It seems to me, 
makes desirable lnltla.tlves towa.rds China. at 
this time. 
'I1here are several obvious areas in whlc:h 
these lnltlatlves wOUld h ave relevance Dts-
crlmlnatory restriction on travel to Ohlna, tor 
e~le, Is certainly one o! these areas. 'Ibe 
Chlnese may or ma.y not admlt Americans 
to their country, as they choose. But It Is 
dlnlcult to '\Ulderstand why our own govern-
ment should 1n any way, shape, or form seek 
to stand In the Wfl.Y o! the attempts of 
American citizens to 1breech the great wall 
of est~ement between t he two nations. It 
Is, Indeed, Ironic that during t he past three 
years there have been more visits of Ameri-
cans to North VIet Nam, a n a tion with 
V>'hlch we are at wa.r, thnn to China In lthe 
p1111t thll'teen years. 
On the question at tnwel, It should be re-
called that .the Chinese were the first to 
suwest 1n 1966 !that Amer!oe.n Journalists 
visit Chl.ll.a 'lhe ~ruggestlon was summarily 
rejooted ,by the then Secretary of S tate. 
W·ben, 1&ter, It was decided to accept t he 
&Uggeatlon, ·the Ch!uese had oha.nged t heir 
minds. Since that tlme, this netlon has been 
more 1nol1ned to ~>~~Be .the travel .barriers, on 
the basis of oftlclal agreement !or exchanges 
of persons, but the Ohlnese have shown n o 
disposition ·to enter tn.to ~eemen,ts or, for 
tha.t n~a~te1, to e.d.inlt Am.erlca.ns on any 
basis. 
In &ny evtnt, It seems to me that It Is In t he 
positive Interest of this nation to enoourage 
Americans, 1! they cap. gain entry, to t ravel 
to China.. May I add, I mer not merely to t he 
travel o! selected journalists, doctors, and 
other specialists, as Is now the policy, but to 
the travel o! any responsible American. In the 
same fashion, It seems to me most appropri-
ate to admit Chinese travelers to the United 
States under the same oonditlons that per-
tain to visitors from other Communist cou n -
tries. 
Trade Is another area In which long-stand-
Ing pollcles respecting China are open to seri-
ous question. Technically, this country stlll 
maintains a.n embargo on all trad e with 
China. The basis for this policy is compli-
ance with a voluntary resolution of the 
United Nations which was adopted at our 
behest at the time of the Korean contl.lct. It 
Is doubtful that the resolution ever carried 
much weight among the trading nations of 
the world. In any case, It has long since been 
forgotten. Today, the principal nations In 
the China trade In rough order of Impor-
tance are the United Kingdom, J apan, the 
Soviet Union, West Germany, Australia , can-
ada, Italy, and France. 0! all the great marl-
time nations, the United States alone clings 
to a total trade embargo with China . More-
over, we are also the only nation In the world 
which makes an eftort to enforce what can 
best be described as a kind o! secondary boy-
cott of re-exported Chinese products. 
These policies have had little visible eco-
nomic Impact, but they have had the most 
serious political repercussions. It Is conceiv-
able that, to the Chinese, the policies are 
something of an Irritant. To friendly nations, 
however, they have been a source of constant 
friction. Most serious, their continuance over 
the years has lnj,.Cted unnecessary venom 
Into the atmosphere of U.S.-Chlnese rela-
tions 
Nor can It be said that the situation In 
VIet Nam has compelled the pursuit of the 
embargo and boyoott. The fact 1s tha t these 
restrictions were in place before most Amer-
Icans ever heard of VIet Nam, and, certainly, 
long before Americans became Involved In 
the war. It the VIetnamese confilct Is now 
seen as justlflcatton for lea ving these pol-
Icies undisturbed, what 1s to be said of the 
existing attitude toward trade with other 
Co=unlst countries? 
The !act Is that the European Communists 
are providing North VIet Na m and the VIet 
Cong with sophisticated mllltary equipment 
which, from all reports, exceeds In value the 
aaststance which comes !rom China. On what 
basis, then, Is It meaningful to permit and 
even to encourage non-strategic t rade with 
the European Communist countries while 
holding to a closed-door policy on trade with 
China? What constructive purpose Is served 
by the distinction? Any rationalization of 
relations with China, It seems to me, will 
require an adjustment of thle dual approach. 
We need to move In the direction of equal 
treatment of all Communist nations In trade 
matters, whatever that treatmen t may be. 
In any event, problems of travel and trade 
are secondary obstacles In t he development 
of a more stable relationship bet ween China 
and the United States. There are other !ar 
more significant dlmcultles. I refer, princi-
pally, to the question of Taiwan and to the 
war in VIetNam. 
'I'here Is no doubt t h at the Chinese gov-
ernment seeks In Viet Nam a government 
• 
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